Великая испанская революция - читать онлайн книгу. Автор: Александр Шубин cтр.№ 164

After the May events, Largo Caballero could continue to head the government upon one of two conditions: either he would yield to dictation and turn into a nominal figure or would take advantage of an unfavorable role of PSUC in the events in Barcelona and weaken the communists and create the government on a new trade-union basis (having balanced GWU and CNT in the rights) and ignoring the president’s opinion appeal to the organized masses. It, certainly, once again would break up the Constitution, but after July 18 it had been broken quite often. Such is Revolution. It was one of the crucial points in the development of the Spanish Revolution, so also of the world. Would there be a new syndicalist model which would exist alongside with American, Soviet and fascist variants of the regulated industrial society? Would the countries taking the path of a social state face a dilemma: to create a new society on the basis of authoritarianism, capitalist pluralism or, as in Spain, on the basis of industrial democracy?

It is obvious that the government which core group would consist of trade-union leaders of CNT and GWU would continue the social transformations focused on the improvement of collectivization and syndicalisation. Such government would investigate the events in Barcelona in the way unfavorable for communists, which could result in slackening of communists in the force structures as well, and at the end of the day — defeat of CPS in the race for power. However, the same course of events meant the overthrow of not only communists, but also of the right socialists and republicans. But in May 1937 Largo Caballero didn’t dare to operate revolutionary. «Spanish Lenin» did not enjoy determination of true Lenin. At the same time, Largo Caballero gave up a role of figurehead of a ship which suddenly altered the course line.

As he didn’t dare to break up with the party-presidential system, Largo Caballero failed, and on May 17 M. Azaña charged a socialist J. Negrin focused on the closest cooperation with CPS with the formation of a new government. The political upheaval was prepared in spring 1937 not in favor of figures, but in favor of the communists block and the right wing of socialists. The social-liberal and communist politicians fixed upon Negrin as the most convenient compromise figure.

Emissaries of Comintern directly participated in such manipulations and were a force in a coalition of «May winners». It was obvious that the right socialists couldn’t have triumphed over Largo Caballero and the social revolution, if they hadn’t obtained communist support.

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Anti-fascists had more than one (external), at least two factors of resistance (which had been already proved by the defense of Madrid) — the revolution and assistance of the USSR. It was impossible to win at that conjuncture, having only one of them. The defeat resulted from not only the weakening of Soviet assistance, but of the revolution as well. Having paralyzed the revolution, the new Spanish government killed incentives of dedicated struggle for a victory. Largo Caballero could combine both such power sources of the Republic. Negrin gave up on one of them following which only the outbreak of the Second World War could save the Republic from ruin.

Up to 1938, the Soviet assistance counterbalanced the material and technical intervention of Germany and Italy, and the inter-brigades — partly the presence of the Italian military contingent. In the end of 1937 the Soviet assistance began to decline, while fascist assistance began to increase. The declining of the Soviet assistance was connected with disappointment of the Soviet government over inability of the new Negrin — Prieto government to achieve the promised breakdown in the war and complication of the international situation when the Spanish problem became less important in comparison with crises in China and Czechoslovakia.

From the second half of 1937 the Soviet assistance was provided to China as well, and the supplies to the East «were subtracted» from the supplies that the USSR could direct to Spain. China was more important yet for the USSR, than Spain — in fact this time the struggle was developed in immediate proximity from the Soviet borders. The peripheral containment of Japan was critical for the USSR during all the 1930s.

In spring-summer 1937 Republicans had an opportunity to recapture the initiative when Franco carried on a two-front war having concentrated forces in the North. Instead of focusing efforts on the victory and preparation of the offensive operation, the communists and social-liberals passionately struggled for power, and the Republic wasted time. In summer they conducted an operation angled towards their style, and it became clear that their methods were not better, but worse than Largo Caballero's war. In July-December, 1937 the chance to recapture the initiative was missed.

Nevertheless, the USSR continued to support the Republic which preservation (even without chance to win) drew Germany and especially Italy away from operations in the east of the Europe.

Handling the assistance that depended on a complex foreign policy situation, Stalin did not discontinue the struggle in Spain and strengthening of the control over the political system of the Republic. As experience of people’s democracies showed, when establishing communist regimes Stalin acted step by step even in much more favorable conditions.

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In May 1937, the revolutionary government was replaced by the coalition having an interest in the decrease and then in the complete reduction of the current revolution. However, the communists which, though seemingly reasonable, were the strongest fraction of May regime and did not give up on an idea to transform Spain into the socialist country (in their understanding of a word). Negrin’s government started de-collectivization and simultaneously nationalization. It was not just deviation from the former revolutionary gains, but change of a vector of revolution from self-government to etatism, governmentalization. The regime which was formed in Spain in May 1937 constituted an early form of «people’s democracy» — the regimes widely spread in the East Europe after the Second World War. «People’s democracy» was the pro-soviet regime combining a liberal facade and authoritarian etatist content. The facade-core ratio of the regime depended on the foreign policy factors, and under the influence of the West the facade could overcome the core in certain conditions. The «People’s democracy» constituted not just displacement of allies by a communist «green cuckoo», but also the synthesis of two etatisms — communistic and social-liberal — on the pro-soviet platform.

The more decisive steps towards «People’s democracy» in Spain could be made after completion of the civil war provided that the international situation had changed. When the time was right, it would be possible to unite communists and supporters of the pro-soviet policy in the united party, and clean up the opposition.

Having missed an opportunity to gain a military victory over the frankists, the Republic had only one chance to survive — to stay the course till the beginning of the Second World War. Such chance appeared in September 1938 due to Sudetic crisis, it continued even in 1939 as the Republic had though small, but sufficient resource of resistance to stay the course for some months in the unpredictable situation of the pre-military Europe.